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IN THE UTAH SUPRF:ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Tf\'l' F:

OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 19284

BOYD DONALD RAGLF:Y,
Def e nda nt-Appe l la nt.

STATEMENT OF Tl!F: NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Boyd Donald Ragley, was charged by
infonnation with a violation of the following provisions of
Utah Code Ann.
41-6-13.5,
76-6-404,

(1953), as amerded:

failure
theft;

§

76-6-202, burglary;

<;;

to respond to officer's signal to
76-8-506,

filing a false report.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before the Honorable Homer F.
\'lilkinson, sitting without a jury,

in the Third Judicial

District in and for Salt Lake County.
of burglary,

Appellant was convicted

theft, and filing a false report.

A stay of the

execution of the sentence was granted, under the following
conditions:
1.

The usual and ordinary conditions required by

the Department of Adult Probation and Parole,

in the amri,rnt nf s7r,n. nn,

2.

Payment of a finP

3.

Payment of restitution to he ckterminccl hy tlw

Department of Adult Probation und Pu role,
4.

Complete the Prison Diversion Proqrum, and

5.

Complete the Weber County Alcohol Rehahilitati::in

Program.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order affirming the judgment of
the lower court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 19, 1982, at 11:57 p.m., Officer Dave
Smith was patrolling

in the area of 3101) East 1300 South when

he noticed a small, light-colored pickup parked at a Rainbo
Service Station.

The station appeared to he closed and Of-

ficer Smith went over to see if perhaps the tenant was simply
late in leaving.

As he drove by the station, Officer Smith

observed a shattered window in the station and a Plale
Caucasian grabbing items out of the cooler (T. 3-6).
Officer Smith drove into the station, parking his
car at an angle in front of the truck.

As he was getting out

of his car, the suspect was leaving the huilrling.

()fficer

Smith drew his gun and ordered the suspect to stop several
times.

The suspect, however, continued towanl

saying, "Don't shoot me.

the truck

Don't shoot me"(T. 7).
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The suspect

,,,L

in the driver's side of the truck and started to back out.

'c'!l11

the truck was backing up, Officer Smith reached into the

''I''

n wiwlow of the rassenger sicle

where a second individual

sPatecl, pointed his gun at the suspect and ordered him to
'top hut

to no avail.

'!'he clriver of the truck continued

hacking slowly towards 33rd South while Officer Smith
maintainecl his hold on the passenger.
dragged

Officer Smith was

in this manner for approximately 75 feet at which

point he became clislodqed and the truck took off headed west
on 31rd South (T. 8-10).
Officer Smith immediately returned to the patrol car
and radioed dispatch to give a description of the truck.
1iithin minutes there was a dispatch call of an accident
involving the supected getaway truck approximately four blocks
away. Officer Smith then went immediately to the scene of the
accident where he identified the vehicle involved as the
getaway truck (T. ln-11).

At the scene of the accident,

Officer Smith was shown a driver's license belonging to
appellant, Boyd Donald Bagley (T.

32), found in the abandoned

truck from which he identified the appellant as the burglary
and the driver of the getaway truck. A couple of hours
later Officer Smith was again shown the driver's license and
he again iclent if ied the appellant as the burglary suspect and
driver of the truck ( T. 20-21).
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Later that morning, arpel lant not if iPd the rolice
that his truck had been stolen.

An appointment was arranqec1

that same afternoon with Detective llrinqlrnrst for appellant tri
file a theft report.

During the meeting with Detective

Bringhurst, appellant was ac1vised that he was a suspect in a
burglary (T. 36-38).
Officer Smith had occasion to be at division
headquarters on an unrelated matter while appellant was being
interviewed by Detective Bringhurst (T.

lhl.

Detective

Bringhurst asked Officer Smith if he could identify the
individual in his office.

Initially Officer Smith was unable

to make a positive identification (T. lR).

Officer Smith left

and returned to Detective Bringhurst's office about 25 minutes
later.

During the next few minutes Officer Smith observed

appellant and listened while he was being questioned

19-20).

(T.

Thereafter, he was able to make another positive

identification of appellant as both the Rainbo burglar anc1
getaway driver (T. 17).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE VERDICT.
In Points I and III of his brief, appellant claims
that his conviction was based upon insufficient evidence.
standard under which a claim of

The

insufficency of the evinence
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mtist be juclgecl has been articulated many times by this Court.
l\nst recently the Court has stated:
Reducecl to essentials, the issue is simply
whether there was evidence adduced at
trial from which the jury coulcl have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Contradictory testimony
alone is not sufficient to clisturb a jury
verclict.
To overturn a verdict on appeal
for insufficiency of evidence, this Court
must find that reasonable mincls must
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt
as to the clefendant' s guilt.
State v.
Watts, No. 18847, p.3, (Utah filed Dec.
It is well established that this Court will overturn
a verdict challenged on insufficiency of the evidence only
"when the evidence is so lacking and

insubstantial that a

reasonable man could not possbily have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable cloubt."
P.2d 942, 945 (1982).

State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652

Additionally, the Court has held it to

be the exclusive function of the jury to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
That the Court might view the eviclence as less than wholly
conclusive is not sufficient to overturn the jury's verdict.
State v.

Howell, Utah, li49 P.2d 'll, 'l7 (1982).
Appellant argues that because conflicting testimony

was offered at trial the state somehow failed to meet its
burden of proof and a finding of reasonable doubt is mandated.
Appellant cites, State v. Wilson, TJtah, 'i65 P.2d 66, 68 (1977)
to support his contention that any evidence offered is

-5-

sufficient to raise a reasonable noubt.

A closer reaninq of

the quoted portion, however, makes clear that "the evidence
[of the defendant] be such as to create a reasonable nouht as
to any element of the crime."

Merely offering conflicting

testimony does not of itself raise a reasonable noubt.

The

Court goes on in Wilson to state that it is a jury function to
weigh the evidence.

Id. at 68.

The mere presentation of

conflicting evidence by the accused does not preclune a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable nouht or no one could
ever be convicted.

State v. Carlsen, Utah, 638 P.2d 512

(1981), cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 14fi9 (1982).

In the absence

of a jury, the trial court is authorized to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and to believe or disbelieve any
witness.

Id. at 515.
The evidence adduced at trial clearly supports the

judge's verdict that appellant burglarized the Rainbo Service
Station.

The truck used as the getaway vehicle was positively

identified just minutes after the incident by Officer Smith
and was subsequently determined to belong to appellant.
Appellant's wallet was in the truck with his driver's license.
Officer Smith was shown the license at the accident scene and
later at police headquarters.

Both times he identified

appellant as the burglary suspect.

Smith mane two subsequent

identifications of appellant as the Rainbo burglar:

one in

Detective Bringhurst's office and the other at trial.
The defense offered three alibi witnesses who
testified that appellant was home at the time of the burglary.

-fi-

Two of these witnesses, appellant's girlfriend Tiffany
Sorrells and another friend Rick Hall, were appellant's
toornrnates.

The third defense witness, Larinda Prisbrey, was

JJall's girlfriend.

All three of these witnesses testified

that Lari nda had telephoned apf)ellant 's apartment at midnight
on September 19, 1982 to talk to Hall and supposedly
appellant answered the phone.
call,

Despite remembering this phone

these defense witnesses had very little recall of

appellant's activity on the aay of the burglary.

Evidence was

also offered that appellant had received a late call from his
sister or sister-in-law telling him the police were looking
for him (T. 44 and 56), but none of the defense witnesses
remembered this seemingly significant call.
There was also testimony that appellant always left
his wallet and keys in his truck at night and used his spare
key to get in the truck in the morning.

When Detective

Rringhurst informed appellant that he would need another key
in order to get the truck from the impound lot (since the set
which had been se izea by the police follow_ing the burglary was
now part of the evidence), appellant told Bringhurst that
there was not another set of truck keys (T. R0-81).
Appellant has failed to show reason why the court
could not fina officer Smith's account of the burglary and his
consecutive identification of appellant as the burglar
sufficienty persuasive to aispel any ooubts raised by the
defense witnesses.

The trial juoge in the instant case was
-7-

under no obligation to accept any view of the evin0nc0 nor
compelled to accept the most incredible inferences.

l\s t'1e

trier of fact the judge considered all the facts shown and
drew the reasonable inferences therefrom.

The rule is that

the evidence depends upon what the jury regards as substantial
and credible.

State v. John, Utah, 58h P.2d 410 (1978).

Therefore, the fact that Judge Wilkinson found Officer Smith's
testimony more credible than the defense

witnesses indicates

that he had no reasonable doubt as to appellant's quilt.

That

Judge Wilkinson was not persuaded by appellant's alibi defense
does not mean that his guilty verdict was based upon
insufficient evidence.

POINT II
APPELLANT'S OBJECTIOP IS tJFITHER TIMELY
NOR SPECIFIC AND IS NOT A PROPER BASIS OF
APPEAL BEFORE THE COURT.
Appellant contends that Officer Smith's in-court
identification was tainted and should not have been admitted,
however, this objection was never raised at trial.

Rule 4,

Utah Rules of Evidence, provides in pertinent part that,
"A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed by reason of the
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a)
there appears of record objection to the
evidence timely interposed and so stated
as to make clear the srecific ground of
objection •
The credibility of the identification was questioned
but not its admissibility.

Even now the basis of appellant's

-8-

nh1 ect ion is unclear.

He never asks for the evidence to be

stricken, apparently contending only that it was given too
'" llCh

crede nee by the trial judge.

shown,

As has been previously

the question of witness credibility falls squarely in

the lap of the trier of fact.
This Court has previously held that the proper
procedure to follow concerning an allegedly suspect
identification is a motion to suppress the identification
testimony before trial.

The second alternative is a defense

motion to suppress during the trial.
2d 396, 4 7 3 P.2d 388 (1970).

State v. McGee, 24 Utah

Neither of these procedures was

followed by defense counsel even though he was aware of the
viewing prior to trial.
In State v. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 947, the Court
endorsed the contemporaneous objection rule requiring a
"timely and specific objection to admission of evidence in
order for the question of admissiblity to be considered on
appeal."

The purpose of the rule is to afford the trial court

an opportunity to address the Clefendant's concern and proceed
with evidence most relevant to the case.

The Court further

held in Mccardell that a new trial should not be granted as a
result of the defendant's failure to provide the trial court
with that opportunity.
Appellant has not made a clear objection to the
admission of Officer Smith's testimony at any point in this
proceeding.

Therefore, appellant's contention that Officer
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Smith's in-court identificatinn was tainted by seeing
appellant in Officer Bringhurst's office is not reviewahle by
this court.

POINT III
UNDER THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES"
TEST, OFFICER
S ORSERVATION OF THE
APPELLANT WAS NOT TAINTED.
In recent years both the United States Supreme Court
and

the Utah Supreme Court have ruled upon the admissibility

of in-court identifications where the witness has particpated
in an iilentification procedure prior to trial.
Denno,

388 U.S.

In Stovall v.

293 (1967), the Court established a "totality

of the circumstances" test to be used

in determining whether a

previous contact had tainted the identification.

It was later

held that each case was to be determined on its own facts and
a pretrial identification should be set aside only if the
procedure was so suggestive as to give rise to a "substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification."
Biggers, 409 U.S. 1R8, 196 (1972).

Neil v.

This standard shifted the

focus to the reliability of the identification rather than the
circumstances under which it was made.

Therefore, the central

issue is whether under the totality of the circumstances the
iilentification was reliable even if the confrontation was
suggestive.

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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Utah has adopted the "totality of the circumstances"
test citing the following as factors to be considered in det r,

rm in i ng re 1iahi1 i ty :
(1) the witness's opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime,
(2) the witness's degree of attention,
(3) the accuracy of any prior description
of the suspect,
( 4) the level of certainty during the
identification procedure, and
( 5) the time between the crime and the
identification.
State v. Mccumber, Utah,
622 P.2d 353 (1980).

In addition, the identification process is not impermissible
unless it can be shown that some external, suggestive
influence so tainted the identification procedure that the
witness would almost inevitably identify the defendant.
State v. Wilson, Utah, 608 P.2d 1237 (19fl0).
It is unclear precisely what appellant is arguing.
He argues that Officer Smith's identification was tainted by
viewing appellant in Detective Rringhurst's office but makes
no showing that the identification was unreliable or that an
identification of appellant was the inevitable result of the
Bringhurst interview.

Nor is there anything in the record to

suggest that Officer Smith's identification was so tainted as
to create a "substantial likelihood of misidentification."
Officer Smith certainly observed the commission of the crime.
Smith testified that the area around the Rainbo Station seemed
fairly well-lighted.

He observed appellant from the time he

exited the Rainbo Station until he entered his truck.
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After

appellant entered his truck,

()ffirer S01ith t0stifircl that he

grabbed hold of the other passenqer and paid partirular
attention to appellant while he was hackinq nut his truck fen
approximately 75 feet.

Apparently Offirrr Smith rlid nnt giv 0

a description of the burqlar although it was

likely

unnecessary based upon his identification of the appellant
from his driver's license.
Later that afternoon, Officer Smith saw appellant
Detective Bringhurst's office.

When asked

if he could irlen-

tify appellant, Smith was initially uncertain.

Officer

left to conduct his other husiness, then returned.
observed appellant and listenerl to him speak at which point he
made an identification.

There is nothing

in the recorrl which

suggests that this irlentification was not the prorluct of
Smith's independent and reliable recollection of the previous
events of that day concerning the gas station hurglary.
This Court has held it to be a function of the jury
to determine whether the witness actually recognizes the defendant

in court.

It is to be det:ermined as a !'1atter of fact.

State v. Spencer, 24 Utah 2cl 361. 471 P.2d 873 (1970).
question concerning an identification is raised,
decided

A

it should be

in the trial court whether there was anything so sug-

gestive that there is a reasonable

likelihoorl the recollection

of the witness was tainted or distorted.
only be disturbed
v.

\-lhen

Perry,

This finding should

if there has clearly heen an error.

27 Utah 2d 4R,

492 P.2d 1349 (1972).

-12-

In

State

State v.

Utah, 6 57 P. 2d 2R9 ( 1982), this court he la that

'"'i discrepancy involving an in-court identification was a
11JattPr of credihility of the evidence, not admissiblity.
''t»dihility and the weight to be given the evidence is a
mrltt0r for the jury to decide.

Thus, it follows that it is

the prerogative of the lower court to determine if Officer
Smith's testimony was reliable and based on independent
recollections of the event.

Any difficulty he may have

experienced in identifying appellant in Detective Rringhurst's
Office goes merely to the weight and credibility of the
evidence.

CONCLUSION
The issue from the appellant's view seems to be that
of necessity a reasonable doubt must exist because of the
admission of conflicting testimony.

This Court has held on

several occasions, however, that it is the prerogative of the
trier of fact to decide the weight and credibility to be given
the evidence.

It would be impossible to ever have a

conviction if the presence of conflicting testimony
automatically mandated a finding of reasonable doubt.
In addition, appellant questions the validity of Officer Smith's testimony but his objection is neither timely
nor specific.

He fails to state a clear objection to this

testimony and contends only that it was given too much weight,
thPrefore, the appeal is not properly before the court.
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Regarding the issue of nfficer Scnith's te>sti"lony,
both this court and the United States Supreme rourt have
established the "totality of the circumstances" test wher0
reliability of the identification is the point of focus
regardless of any suspect viewing.

There was no showing that

Officer Smith's in-court identification was not re>liahle nor
that there was a "substantial, likelihood of irreparable
misidentification."

For these reasons, appellant's conviction

//'7

should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted

day of January,

1984.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
AttornPy General

General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy
of the foregoing brief, postage prepaid to Kenneth L. Rothey,
attorney for appellant, 942 East 714S South, HlOR, 11irlvale,
utah 84047, this

'Ori-day
J!l:_

of January, 1984.
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